fix: harden auth, SSRF, query engine, and cookie security

This commit is contained in:
2026-03-18 11:37:33 +04:00
parent d278ab0458
commit 5a0cf5033b
14 changed files with 212 additions and 28 deletions
+5 -1
View File
@@ -218,7 +218,11 @@ fn eval_op(op: &str, field_val: &Value, val: &Value, response: &Response) -> Res
}
"$regex" => {
let pattern = val.as_str().unwrap_or("");
let re = Regex::new(pattern).unwrap_or_else(|_| Regex::new("$^").unwrap());
if pattern.len() > 200 { return Ok(false); }
let re = match Regex::new(pattern) {
Ok(r) => r,
Err(_) => return Ok(false),
};
field_val.as_str().map(|s| re.is_match(s)).unwrap_or(false)
}
"$exists" => {
+13 -1
View File
@@ -118,7 +118,19 @@ async fn run_check(client: &reqwest::Client, monitor: &Monitor, scheduled_at: Op
.filter_map(|(k, v)| Some((k.to_string(), v.to_str().ok()?.to_string())))
.collect();
let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
// Limit response body to 10MB to prevent OOM from malicious targets
const MAX_BODY_BYTES: usize = 10 * 1024 * 1024;
let body = {
let content_len = resp.content_length().unwrap_or(0) as usize;
if content_len > MAX_BODY_BYTES {
// Skip reading body entirely if Content-Length exceeds limit
format!("[body truncated: Content-Length {} exceeds 10MB limit]", content_len)
} else {
let bytes = resp.bytes().await.unwrap_or_default();
let truncated = &bytes[..bytes.len().min(MAX_BODY_BYTES)];
String::from_utf8_lossy(truncated).into_owned()
}
};
// Evaluate query if present
let (up, query_error) = if let Some(q) = &monitor.query {